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INDIAN GAMING-The First Circuit Interprets the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act: Rhode Island v. Narragansett
Indian Tribe
I.

INTRODUCTION

Gambling in the United States is big business. In the past decade,
annual gross revenues from the gambling industry have grown from less
than $14 billion to more than $30 billion.' Indian gaming is fast becoming
a large part of this industry, accounting for $6 billion a year. 2 Accompanying the growth of Indian gaming is conflict over its future. In fact,
the fight over Indian gaming has escalated into an all-out war.3 One

reason for the conflict is that tribal casinos are seen as a potential enemy
of the conventional gambling industry.4 Another reason is that state
politicians, many of whom oppose gambling of all types in their states,
certainly do not want gambling that would not produce any state tax
revenue. 5 However, despite strong opposition, Indian gaming has spread

across the United States at a remarkable
rate. Twenty-four states currently
6
have some form of tribal gaming.
The federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) governs gambling

on Indian reservations. 7 Since its enactment in 1988, the IGRA has

1. Rick Wartzman & Pauline Yoshihashi, Gambling Industry Says Tax Means Snake Eyes, But
from Washington It Looks Like a Natural, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1994, at A16. The industry is
expected to keep growing at a healthy rate. Id.
2. Pauline Yoshihashi, Gambling: As Indian Casinos Spread, Politicians and Rivals Maneuver
to Fight the Trend, WALL ST. J., May 4, 1993, at BI. Indian gaming has become the most
geographically widespread form of legal gaming. Id.
3. See id. ("Regional fights over Indian casinos, one of the fastest-growing sectors of legal
gambling, have escalated into all-out political war."). Both politicians and conventional casino
operators are trying to halt the spread of tribal gaming. Id. Recently, well-known casino entrepreneur
Donald Trump sued Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt and the chairman of the National Indian
Gaming Commission, charging them with providing Indians with preferential treatment in the issuance
of casino licenses and alleging that the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act is unconstitutional.
Id.
4. See id. (noting that Indian casinos have the most potential to hurt the conventional gambling
industry).
5. See id. ("[T]o many politicians, the only thing worse than a casino in their state is one
that doesn't produce any dollars for the public coffers.").
6. As of May 1993, states with Indian gaming and the number of operations in each are:
Oklahoma (23); California (15); Wisconsin (13); Minnesota (12); Washington (9); Michigan (8);
Arizona (7); South Dakota (6); New Mexico (5); New York (5); Florida (4); Kansas (3); North
Dakota (2); Oregon (2); Alabama (1); Colorado (1); Connecticut (i); Iowa (1); Idaho (1); Louisiana
(1); Missouri (1); Mississippi (1); Montana (1); and Nebraska (1). Id.
7. The IGRA is codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1988). "The purpose of this chapter is
(3) to declare . . . the establishment of independent federal regulatory authority for gaming on
Indian lands [and] the establishment of Federal standards for gaming on Indian lands .
Id.
§ 2702.
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spawned a substantial amount of litigation. Rhode Island v. Narragansett
Indian Tribe" ("Narragansett"), which interprets the requirements of the
IGRA and its effect on previous agreements between the states and Indian
tribes, is a landmark case in the evolution of the IGRA and provides
strong precedent for future IGRA litigation.
This Note presents Narragansett as an example of how the courts will
interpret the IGRA, the most comprehensive piece of legislation dealing
with the issue of Indian gaming to date. In Part II, this Note presents
the historical background of the IGRA and the Rhode Island Indian
Claims Settlement Act ("Settlement Act"), a pre-IGRA agreement between
the state of Rhode Island and the Narragansett Indian Tribe ("the Tribe").
Part III examines Narragansett and its interpretation of the IGRA. Part
IV presents a critical analysis of the First Circuit's decision in Narragansett
and discusses the constitutional issues relating to the IGRA. Finally, Part
V looks at the impact of Narragansett on the future of the IGRA.
II. BACKGROUND
The Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act
The dispute over Indian gaming in Rhode Island began in 1978 when
the Narragansett Tribe filed two lawsuits in federal court seeking approximately 3,200 acres of public and private land in Charlestown, Rhode
Island. 9 The suits named the Director of the Rhode Island Department
of Environmental Management and "myriad private landowners" as defendants in the suit.' 0 The Tribe claimed that it owned and occupied
these lands "as part of its aboriginal territory and reservation."" Because
these pending lawsuits threatened ill economic effects for the residents
of Charlestown,12 rigorous negotiations were conducted by the parties."
As a result, the parties reached an agreement in which the Tribe agreed
to abandon its land claims in return for a lump sum payment and
approximately 1800 acres of land. 4 As part of this agreement, the Rhode
Island legislature passed the Narragansett Indian Land Management Corporation Act.' 5 This Act created a corporation charged with managing
and holding title to the real property that the Tribe acquired.' 6 Finally,

A.

8. 19 F.3d 685, cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 298 (1994).
9. Town of Charlestown v. United States, 696 F. Supp. 800, 801-02 (D.R.I. 1988), aff'd, 873
F.2d 1433 (1st Cir. 1989). The two lawsuits were later consolidated. Id. at 802.
10. Id.at 801.
11. Id.at 802.
12. "[Tlhe pendency of these lawsuits has resulted in severe economic hardships for the residents
of the town of Charlestown by clouding the titles to much of the land in the town, including lands
not involved in the lawsuits." 25 U.S.C. § 1701(b) (1988).
13. Charlestown, 696 F. Supp. at 802.
14. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 689.
15. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 37-18-1 to 37-18-15 (1990).
16. Id.§ 37-18-4. The statute provided that the corporation would expire once the Tribe received
recognition. Id. § 37-18-12.
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because Congress possesses plenary power over Indian affairs, 7 the parties
sought and obtained the approval of Congress, which blessed the Narragansett Indian Land Management Corporation Act by passing the Settlement Act."8
Generally, the Settlement Act reflects the original agreement between
the state and the Tribe.19 Specifically, it authorizes the money used to
purchase 900 acres of private land for the Tribe. 20 Additionally, the
Settlement Act grants a general exemption from federal, state, and local
taxation to the settlement lands, 2 ' but states that the exemption does not
apply to any income-producing activities occurring on the land.2 2 The
enactment of the Settlement Act was seen as a first of its kind 3 and a
milestone in Indian relations. 24
Beginning in 1983, the Settlement Act went through a number of
changes. In 1983, the Secretary of the Interior recognized the Tribe as
an Indian Tribe. 25 As a result, the Narragansett Indian Land Management
Corporation Act was amended to allow the corporation to transfer settlement lands to the Tribe. 6 Subsequently, the Tribe deeded the settlement
lands to the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs as trustee. 27
B.

The Federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
During the five years prior to the enactment of the IGRA, numerous
bills were introduced in Congress to address the issue of gaming on
Indian lands.28 In 1986, California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians29
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3 (providing Congress with power to "regulate Commerce
...with the Indian Tribes"); see also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974) (noting the
"plenary power of Congress to deal with the special problems of Indians").
18. The Settlement Act is codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1716 (1988).
19. "[Tjhe parties to the lawsuits and others interested in the settlement of Indian land claims
within the State of Rhode Island have executed a Settlement Agreement which requires implementing
legislation by the Congress ...." Id. § 1701(d).
[B]y virtue of the approval of a transfer of land . . . all claims against the United
States, any State or subdivision thereof ... by the Indian Corporation . . . arising
subsequent to the transfer and based upon any interest in or right involving such
land or natural resources .. .shall be regarded as extinguished as of the date of
the transfer.
Id. § 1705(a)(3).
20. Id. § 1710 ("There is hereby authorized to be appropriated $3,5000,000 to carry out the
purposes of this subchapter.").
21. Id. § 1715(a).
22. Id. § 1715(b).
23. "[The Settlement Act] represents the first legislation submitted to Congress which would
resolve the land claims of an Indian tribe ...." H.R. REP. No. 1453, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7,
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1948, 1951.
24. "[The Settlement Act] will serve as a landmark for the resolution of other land claims
....11 Id.
25. 48 Fed. Reg. 6177-78 (1983).
26. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 37-18-14 (1990).
27. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 689.
28. See Roland J. Santoni, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: How Did We Get Here? Where
Are We Going?, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 387, 395 (1993). For a complete treatment of the legislation
introduced at this time, see id.; see also S. REP. No. 446, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1988), reprinted
in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3073 [hereinafter Senate Report] ("[The IGRA] is the outgrowth of
several years of discussions and negotiations.
29. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
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reached the Supreme Court's docket and drastically changed the direction

of gaming legislation.30 In Cabazon, a tribe sued a 3county for attempting

to regulate bingo and card games on Indian lands. The tribe eventually
emerged victorious when the Court held that the state could not regulate
tribal bingo. 3 2 However, the mere pendency of this case in front of the

Supreme Court had a dramatic effect. Indian tribes, concerned that the

Court might rule that regulation of Indian lands was proper, began to
demonstrate a willingness to compromise with lawmakers in achieving
federal legislation on Indian gaming.33 In contrast, the states, confident
that the Court would rule in favor of state regulation, became more
34
steadfast in their opposition of Indian gaming. The majority of op-

position to Indian gaming came not from anti-gambling factions but

35
from states where gambling was already legal, demonstrating that op-

position to the legislation was based primarily on economic rather than
37

moral/social reasons.3 6 Various Indian leaders also opposed the IGRA.
Despite this opposition, the IGRA moved toward approval.
Congress finally approved the IGRA in 1988 with the explicit primary
3
goals of economic and political development for Indian tribes " and the
9 The IGRA also
protection of Indian gaming from criminal influences.
can be viewed as an attempt by Congress to fulfill what it sees as an
obligation to Indian tribes to provide economic support without the
consequences of government spendingA° In enacting the IGRA, Congress

30. Senate Report, supra note 28, at 3073 ("On April 29, 1986, the Supreme Court docketed
the Cabazon case, significantly altering the course of the legislation as it was referred to the
Senate.").
31. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 204-06.
32. Id. at 221-22. The Court concluded that the state's interest in preventing the infiltration of
organized crime did not justify state regulation in light of the tribe's interest in self-government.
Id.
33. Senate Report, supra note 28, at 3073-74.
34. Id. at 3074.
35. Eric J. Swanson, The Reservation Gaming Craze: Casino Gambling under the Indian Gaming
and Regulatory Act of 1988, 15 HAMLINE L. REV. 471, 475 (1992).
36. See 134 CONG. REC. 24,028 (1988) (statement of Sen. Evans) ("We should be candid about
the interests surrounding this particular piece of legislation. The issue has never really been one of
crime control, morality, or economic fairness.").
37. See 134 CONG. REc. 24,026 (1988) (statement of Sen. McCain) ("[A] few days ago a number
of Indian leaders held a press conference here in Washington to express their strong opposition to
the [IGRA] .... ").
38. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (1988) ("[One purpose is] to provide a statutory basis for the operation
of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency,
and strong tribal governments."); see also id. § 2701(4) ("[Congress finds that] a principal goal of
Federal Indian policy is to promote tribal economic development, tribal self-sufficiency, and strong
tribal government.").
39. Id. § 2702(2) (One purpose is to "shield [the Indians] from organized crime and other
corrupting influences."); see also Senate Report, supra note 28, at 3071 (recognizing "fear that
Indian Bingo and other gambling enterprises may become targets for infiltration by criminal elements").
40. See William T. Bisset, Tribal-State Gaming Compacts: The Constitutionality of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71, 73 (1993) ("Indian gaming still had strong
support in Congress from legislators who believed the federal government had a moral duty to
Moreover, gaming offered the added advantage
provide financial support to Indian Tribes ....
of requiring little federal assistance at a time of deep concern over the growing budget deficit.").
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attempted to balance the states' interests in regulating gambling with the
tribes" interest of self-government. 4 ' Judicial insight into the purposes of
the IGRA appears in several cases. In Red Lake Band of Chippewa
43
Indians v. Swimmer, 42 Indian tribes challenged the validity of the IGRA.
The district court held that the IGRA was valid and that the legislation
was related to Congress' trust responsibility to Indians and its desire to
protect Indians from organized crime."
Through the IGRA, Congress constructed a regulatory scheme for
gambling on Indian reservations. The IGRA defines a species of gambling,
called "gaming," and separates it into three distinct "classes. ' 45 Class
I gaming consists of traditional forms of Indian ritual games. 46 This class
of gaming is not affected by the IGRA and cannot be regulated by the
states.47 Class II gaming covers such games as bingo, card games allowed
by the state, pull-tabs, lotto, and other games similar to bingo.4 Class
II gaming can be conducted if the state does not generally proscribe this
type of gaming. 49 Class III gaming includes all other types of gaming.50
It encompasses the most important part of the IGRA because it includes
"high stakes" casino-type games which can be a source of substantial
revenue for the Indian tribes and a significant rival for the traditional
private sector casinos.' It is this class of gaming which is the subject
2
.
of litigation in Narragansett

41. See 134 CONG. REc. 24,022 (1988) (statement of Sen. Inouye) ("[Tlhe committee has attempted
to balance the need for sound enforcement of gaming laws and regulations, with the strong Federal
interest in preserving the sovereign rights of tribal governments to regulate activities and enforce
laws on Indian lands.").
42. 740 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1990).
43. Id. at 10. The plaintiffs, the Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians and the Mescalero Apache
Tribe, sued the Department of the Interior to prevent the implementation of the IGRA. Id. at 10.
The tribes argued against implementation of the IGRA on four grounds: (1) the IGRA violated
their right to self-determination; (2) "Congress violated its federal trust responsibility to the Indians"
by enacting the IGRA; (3) the IGRA unconstitutionally restricted the power of the federal courts;
and (4) the IGRA violated their Fifth Amendment right to self-government. Id. at 10-11.
44. Id. at 13-14. In upholding the IGRA, the court first asserted that Congress holds "virtually
unlimited power over the Indian tribes." Id. at 11. The court then noted the IGRA's legislative
history and concluded that the IGRA was enacted for the benefit of Indians. Id. at 13. The court
also found that the IGRA did not deny the tribes due process. Id. at 14. Finally, the court noted
that judicial relief was limited to "ordering the parties to conclude a compact." Id.
45. 25 U.S.C. § 2703 (1988) (setting forth three classes of gaming).
46. Id. § 2703(6) (1988) ("The term 'class I gaming' means social games solely for prizes of
minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming ....").
47. Id. § 2710(a)(1) ("Class I gaming on Indian lands is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Indian tribes and shall not be subject to the provisions of this chapter.").
48. Id. § 2703(7) ("The term 'class II gaming' means .. . bingo .. .other games similar to
bingo .. .and card games [allowed by the state] ....").
49. Id. § 2710(b)(l)-(A) ("An Indian tribe may engage in ... class II gaming ... if . . .such
Indian gaming is located within a State that permits such gaming ....").
50. Id. § 2703(8) ("The term 'class III gaming' means all forms of gaming that are not class
I gaming or class II gaming.").
51. See supra notes 2, 4 and accompanying text.
52. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 688 (The Narragansett Tribe requested that Rhode Island enter into
negotiations for a tribal-state compact as to Class III gaming under the IGRA.).
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The Regulation of Class III Gaming Under the IGRA
In regulating class III gaming, the IGRA requires that: 1) an ordinance
allowing such gaming is adopted by the governing body of the tribe; 2)
the state allows this type of gaming for any purpose by any person; and
3) the gaming is conducted in compliance with a tribal-state compact
entered into by the Indian tribe and the state.53 The regulation of class
4
III gaming has been the most controversial part of the IGRA and the
subject of considerable litigation between various Indian tribes and the
C.

states.55

The starting point for an analysis of class III. gaming under the IGRA
5 6
requires a determination of whether the state permits such gaming.

courts must
Examination of this issue requires a two-step analysis. 57 First,
5

determine if the game can legally be played in the state. " If it can, the
59
game is to be included in the compact. If not, step two requires the
the state's public policy.6
violates
game
particular
the
court to determine if
the compact. 61 Therefore,
in
If it does not, then the game is to be included
and against public policy are removed
only games prohibited by the state
62
process.
compacting
from the
After determining whether or not the state permits the type of gaming,
courts look for compliance with the IGRA's class III compacting process.
A considerable amount of litigation has produced a number of guidelines
concerning the compacting process for class III gaming. First, courts
unanimously agree that the only way for a state to regulate class III

53. 24 U.S.C. § 2710(d).
54. See T. Barton French, Jr., Note, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and the Eleventh
Amendment: States Assert Sovereign Immunity Defense to Slow Growth of Indian Gaming, 71
WASH. U. L.Q. 735, 736 (1993) ("The most controversial aspect of IGRA has been the 'compacting'
process between the tribes and the states.").
55. See infra notes 63-72 and accompanying text.
56. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(l)-(B) (1988) (stating that class III gaming shall be lawful only if "located
in a State that permits such gaming").
57. Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Texas, 852 F. Supp. 587, 593 (W.D. Tex. 1993) ("[A] two-step
analysis must be employed to determine which Class III games are the proper subject of a TribalState Compact."); see also Rumsey Indian Rancheria of Wintun Indians v. Wilson, No. CIV-S-92812, 1993 WL 360652 at *7 (E.D. Cal. July 20, 1993) ("The effect of IGRA is simply to provide
a shortened application of the Cabazon rule where a game is found to be played within a state.
In every other
In such instance, no further analysis is necessary to find the game is proper ....
case, however, Cabazon retains its full vitality and a game will only be prohibited . . . if it violates
the state's public policy.").
58. Ysleta, 852 F. Supp. at 593.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. In addressing the situation where a state public policy opposes a particular game, it has
been held that a broad public policy against gaming may not remove a state's obligation to enter
into negotiations on class III gaming. See id. at 592-93 (holding that Texas can no longer assert
a broad public policy against gambling when it allowed horse and dog racing, bingo, and a staterun lottery). But see Coeur D'Alene Tribe v. State, 842 F. Supp. 1268 (D. Idaho 1994) (holding
that state was not required to negotiate with tribe because state constitution declared gambling
contrary to public policy and was strictly prohibited except for three limited exceptions).
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gaming is through the compacting process. 63 Additionally, the only pre-

requisite to a state's obligation to enter into negotiations on a compact

is that the Indian tribe request the negotiations. 64 One recognized limit
on the Indians' compacting power is that a state is not required to reenter negotiations on class III gaming after a compact has been signed. 65
Also, one court has gone so far as to say that while a state is required

to enter into negotiations, it is not required to enter into a compact. 66

Thus, it is widely accepted that the compacting process is a power bestowed
upon the Indian tribes and is a mere courtesy towards the states.67
In determining whether or not there has been compliance with the
compacting process for class III gaming, courts determine whether the
IGRA mandate that a state enter into "good faith" negotiations with
an Indian tribe has been met. 68 But what does "good faith" mean in
the context of the IGRA? On this issue, there is little direction. One
option is that the requirement of good faith be applied under an objective
69

test.

An argument for an objective test is that an objective test is

appropriate when there is unequal bargaining power among the parties.7 °
Regardless, no court has set out a definite standard for the good faith
test. It has been held, however, that the determination of whether a state
has negotiated in good faith should be based on the transcripts of the
negotiations themselves and not with reference to positions taken outside
63. See Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 690 ("[Tlhe tribal-state compact is the exclusive method
of
regulating class III gaming."); see also Keetoowah Indians v. Oklahoma, 927 F.2d 1170, 1177
(10th
Cir. 1991) ("[The IGRAJ permits assertion of state civil or criminal jurisdiction over Indian
gaming
only when a tribal-state compact has been reached to regulate class III gaming.") (emphasis
added);
Sycuan Band of Mission Indians v. Roache, 788 F. Supp. 1498, 1504 (S.D. Cal. 1992) (stating
that
jurisdiction is limited to tribal-state compact); Senate Report, supra note 28, at 3075-76
("The
mechanism for facilitating the unusual relationship in which a tribe might affirmatively
seek the
extension of State jurisdiction and the application of state laws to activities conducted
on Indian
land is a tribal-State compact.").
64. See Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F.2d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1990)
("[T]he
IGRA plainly requires a state to enter into negotiations with a tribe upon request.").
65. See Wisconsin Winnebago Nation v. Thompson, 22 F.3d 719, 723-24 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding
that state was not required to negotiate when compact was previously signed six months
prior to
request for re-negotiations).
66. See Yavapai-Prescott Indian Tribe v. Arizona, 796 F. Supp. 1292, 1297 (D. Ariz.
1992)
("IGRA's terms do not force the State to enter into a compact, it only demands good
faith
negotiation[s] .... ).
67. See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 830 F. Supp. 523, 526 (D.S.D.
1993)
(stating that "Congress wished to give states a certain amount of input into gambling
on Indian
reservations."); see also Senate Report, supra note 28, at 3074 (stating Congress' intent
to allow
states to participate in regulation of Indian gaming); 134 CONG. REc. S12,643-01 (daily
ed. Sept.
15, 1988) (statement of Senator Inouye) ("The compacts are not intended to impose de
facto State
regulation.").
68. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(1) (1988) ("The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction
over ... any cause of action ... arising from the failure of a State . . . to conduct such negotiations
in good faith ....");see also Cheyenne, 830 F. Supp. at 527 (discussing whether state
negotiated
in good faith).
69. See Nancy McKay, Comment, The Meaning of Good Faith in the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 471, 486 (1992) ("[T]he court could help effectuate Congress' intent
in the
[IGRA] and provide guidince to other courts by examining the meaning of good faith and
adopting
the objective test for its determination."). For a complete survey of the various "good faith"
tests,
see id.
70. Id. at 485.
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the negotiation process. 71 Furthermore, one court has refused to examine
whether a state acted in good faith after signing a compact, stating that
a tribe's challenge72 to a state's good faith should come during the negotiation process.

D. The Special Rules of Interpretationfor Indian Legislation
the unique "decisional
In analyzing Narragansett,it is vital to recognize
7
court clearly states
The
operating.
framework" in which the court is
a "distinctive perfrom
Narragansett
that it is viewing the issues in
'7 4 This perspective is a result of long-established special rules
spective."
75

of interpretation for Indian legislation.

The general rule of interpretation for Indian legislation is that any
doubts or ambiguities in the statute are to be resolved in favor of the
Indians.76 The expressed justification for this rule is that Indians are in
need of special protection by the federal government and the court7

treatment.
system. 77 Thus, the rule provides Indian tribes with "special

is only operative
It has been cautioned, however, that this special rule
79 It is particularly
legislation.
the
in
exists
ambiguity
or
where doubt
important in analyzing Narragansett to note that this special rule of°
interpretation has been previously applied to the issue of Indian sovereignty
because it aids the Narragansett court in reaching a number of rulings.
It is certainly arguable that the application of this rule has been an

important factor in a series of court decisions that run in favor of tribal
gaming."
71. Cheyenne, 830 F. Supp. at 527 (noting that determination of good faith should be derived
from negotiation sessions).
72. Wisconsin Winnebago Nation v. Thompson, 22 F.3d 719, 723-24 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding
that tribe cannot claim bad faith after completed compact was signed).
73. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 691 (setting forth court's "decisional framework").
74. Id.
75. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199 (1975) (noting that special rules for interpretation
of Indian legislation have been established for over one and one-half centuries).
76. See South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. 498, 506 (1986) (noting "canon of
v.
construction regarding the resolution of ambiguities in favor of Indians"); Rosebud Sioux Tribe
in favor of
Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 586 (1977) (holding that doubtful expressions are to be resolved
Indians); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 444 (1975) (holding that ambiguities
are to be resolved in favor of Indians); Antoine, 420 U.S. at 199-200 (stating that doubts are to
be resolved in favor of Indians).
77. See Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 586 (characterizing Indians as "weak and defenseless people" who
are "wards of the nation" and in need of the government's "protection and good faith") (quoting
McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm., 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973)).
for
78. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554 (1974) (noting that Court has held out Indians
"particular and special treatment").
79. See Catawba, 476 U.S. at 506 ("The canon of construction ... does not permit reliance
on ambiguities that do not exist; nor does it permit disregard of the clearly expressed intent of
Congress."); DeCoteau 420 U.S. at 447 ("We give this [Indian legislation interpretation] rule the
A canon of construction is not a
broadest possible scope, but it remains at base a canon ....
license to disregard clear expressions of tribal and congressional intent.").
80. See Edmond F. Leedham, III, Note, The Indian Gaming Controversy in Connecticut: Forging
a Balance Between Tribal Sovereignty and State Interests, 13 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 649, 662 (1993)
(noting that legislation affecting tribal sovereignty is construed in favor of Indians).
81. See Swanson, supra note 35, at 478 (noting series of decisions in favor of Indians).
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RHODE ISLAND V. NARRAGANSETT INDIAN TRIBE

A.

Facts and ProceduralHistory
On January 15, 1992, the Tribe requested that the state of Rhode
Island enter into negotiations on a tribal-state compact for class III
gaming in accordance with the IGRA.8 2 The state refused to negotiate,
instead filing suit in federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief.83 In this action, the state asked the court to rule that the IGRA
did not apply to the settlement lands in question and to issue an injunction
against the development of gambling facilities on these lands. 84 The Tribe,
in turn, sought an injunction commanding the state to negotiate in good
faith.8 5 After a number of rulings,8 6 the district court ordered the state
to enter into good faith negotiations on the tribal-state compact. 87 After
the state appealed the district court's decision, the district court stayed
its order. 8
In Narragansett, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, sets
forth a comprehensive treatment of the IGRA and, in particular, its
application to the Narragansett Indian settlement lands. The court first
summarized the history of the Settlement Act.8 9 The court then discussed
the IGRA and its classification scheme.9 After reviewing the district
court's decision, 9' the court stated its decisional framework, that being
one of deference to the Tribe.92 The court, overruling the lower court,
held that the issue of jurisdiction was ripe for trial.93 At this point, the
court addressed the major substantive issues of the case.

82. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 690.
83. Rhode Island v. Narragansett Tribe of Indians, 816 F. Supp. 796 (D.R.I. 1993).
84. Id. at 798. The state requested that the court declare that "(1) the [IGRA] does not apply
to the settlement lands; and (2) that those lands are subject to the criminal, civil, and civil regulatory
laws of Rhode Island and the Town of Charlestown, including criminal and civil laws regulating
gambling." Id. The state asked the court to enjoin the Tribe from "taking any action to develop
or use the settlement lands not in compliance with State and local laws." Id. Moreover, the state
asked the court to enjoin "the State and the Tribe from negotiating a Tribal-State compact under
the [IGRA]." Id.
85. Id.
86. The district court first ruled that the issue of jurisdiction over the land lacked ripeness. Id.
at 799-800. The court then held that any grant of jurisdiction to the state under the Settlement
Act was "preempted" by the IGRA. Id. This holding was based on the court's findings that
precedent directed that the IGRA preempted earlier federal statutes, that Rhode Island was not
exempt from the IGRA, and that the Tribe met the requirements of the two-pronged test of the
IGRA. Id. at 801-806. For an explanation of the two-prong test of the IGRA, see infra notes 10223 and accompanying text.
87. Id. at 806.
88. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 691.
89. See id.at 698; supra notes 9-27 and accompanying text.
90. See Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 689-90; supra notes 28-72 and accompanying text.
91. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 690-91.
92. Id. at 691-92; see supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
93. See Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 692-94 ("Accordingly, we rule that the basic issue of state and
local jurisdiction . . .is ripe for declaratory judgment purposes.").
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The Grant of Jurisdiction in the Settlement Act
The first major issue discussed by the First Circuit in Narragansett,
one with important ramifications,9 is whether the Settlement Act confers
civil regulatory jurisdiction to Rhode Island. The Tribe argued that it
did not, 95 based on the Settlement Act's plain language.9 The Tribe
argued that because an early version of the bill transferred "the complete
civil and criminal jurisdiction" and the final bill transferred "the civil
and criminal laws and jurisdiction," the absence of "complete" in the
final version evidenced Congress' intent 9to limit the jurisdiction to the
state.Y The court rejected this argument, specifically noting that "complete" in this context means "exclusive" and that the removal of the
word "complete" in the final draft was done to avoid conferring exclusive
jurisdiction on the state.Y The court then emphasized that the° Settlement
Act was a mere "implementation" of the previous agreement.' Therefore,
the court concluded that the Settlement Act conferred civil regulatory
jurisdiction on the State.' 0 '

B.

The Two-Pronged Test of the IGRA
was
The second issue discussed by the First Circuit in Narragansett
°2 In analyzing
whether the IGRA applies to the Tribe's settlement lands.'
this issue, the court focused on the dual requirements of "jurisdiction"
03
and "governmental power" necessary to invoke the IGRA.1
C.

1. The Requirement of Jurisdiction
The state argued, and the court agreed, that in order to invoke the
IGRA an Indian tribe must exercise jurisdiction over the settlement

94. See infra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.

95. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 695.
96. "Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, the Settlement lands shall be subject to
the civil and criminal laws and jurisdiction of the State of Rhode Island." 25 U.S.C. § 1708 (1988).
97. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 696. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 383 (1976) (holding
that civil jurisdiction was only adjudicatory jurisdiction meant to solve private legal disputes).
98. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 696. The court held that the present case did not have an analogous
legislative history to Bryan. Id. See also Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 599 (1977)
(holding that there is "implied continuity in purpose" from one version of act to next).
99. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 695. See also United States v. Cook, 922 F.2d 1026, 1032 (2d Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991) (holding that removal of word "complete" in final draft
of Indian legislation meant that grant of jurisdiction was not exclusive).
100. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 696; Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 600 ("Congress ... thought that it was
acting pursuant to the earlier version."); see also 25 U.S.C. § 1701(d).
101. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 696 ("[Wle conclude that the Settlement Act granted civil regulatory
jurisdiction, as well as civil adjudicatory jurisdiction, to the state."). But see Maynard v. Narragansett
Indian Tribe, 798 F. Supp. 94, 99 (D.R.I. 1992) (holding that Settlement Act, in conferring state
jurisdiction over settlement lands, does not abrogate tribe's civil regulatory power and that Settlement
Act subjects settlement lands to state civil and criminal laws, but not all laws).
102. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 701.
103. Id. at 702.
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lands.'04 This requirement is derived from the language of the statute. 05
Therefore, the court examined whether the Tribe had jurisdiction over
the settlement lands.' °
Stating that it was operating from a "backdrop" of Indian sovereignty, 0 7 the court emphasized the well-accepted rule that Indian tribes
are a distinct people with a long-standing history of sovereignty and selfgovernment. 08 This sovereignty has been held to include the power of
regulation over Indian settlement lands.'0 9 Thus, the court invoked a
presumption of sovereignty for determining whether the Tribe had jurisdiction over the settlement lands." 0
In addition the court found that, pursuant to the Settlement Act, the
Tribe retained concurrent jurisdiction."' Moreover, the court concluded
that concurrent jurisdiction by an Indian tribe was sufficient to meet the
jurisdictional requirement of the IGRA," 2 thus satisfying the first prong
of the IGRA.
In ruling that concurrent jurisdiction is sufficient to meet the jurisdictional requirement of the IGRA, the court examined whether or not
the Settlement Act granted exclusive jurisdiction to the state. If it did,
the Tribe would fail to meet the jurisdictional requirement and the IGRA
would be inapplicable. The language of the Settlement Act provides no
help in determining whether the grant of jurisdiction was exclusive." 3'
The court pointed to another section of the act which uses the modifier

104. Id.
105. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1988) ("Any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian
lands ... shall request the State ... to enter into negotiations .... ") (emphasis added); id.
§ 2710(b)(1) ("An Indian tribe may engage in ... class III gaming on Indian lands within such
tribe's jurisdiction ....
) (emphasis added).
106. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 701-02.
107. Id. at 701; see also McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm., 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973)
(stating that "Indian sovereignty . . . provides [the] backdrop").
108. See Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 701 (noting history of tribal sovereignty); see also Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176 (1989) (recognizing "history of tribal sovereignty"); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (stating that Indian tribes are
"distinct, independent, political communities"); McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172 (noting inherent Indian
sovereignty); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) (stating that Indians are "people
distinct from others"). But see United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (stating that
Indian tribes are no longer "possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty"). This assumption of
sovereignty is seen as a departure from the previous policy of Indian assimilation. See Robert B.
Porter, Note, The JurisdictionalRelationship Between the Iroquois and New York State: An Analysis
of 25 U.S.C. §§ 232, 233, 27 HARV. J. ON LEaIs. 497, 506 (1990) (recognizing change in policy
from assimilation to sovereignty).
109. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (holding that sovereignty includes
power to regulate).
110. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 701-02. But see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Deference Owed Tribal
Courts' Jurisdictional Determinations: Towards Co-Existence, Understanding, and Respect Between
Different Cultural and Judicial Norms, 24 N.M. L. REV. 191, 191 (1994) ("The Court has refocused
the inquiry [of jurisdiction] by moving away from a discussion of the existence of tribal jurisdiction
based on Indian sovereignty .... ").
111. See infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
112. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 701 ("[Wle rule ... that such concurrent jurisdiction is sufficient
to satisfy the corresponding precondition to applicability of the [IGRA].").
113. 25 U.S.C. § 1708 (1988) ("[T]he settlement lands shall be subject to the civil and criminal
laws and jurisdiction of the State of Rhode Island.").
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"exclusive" in a jurisdictional setting, 1"4 thus making the deduction that
if an exclusive grant of jurisdiction to the state was meant, the Settlement
'
Act would include the term "exclusive jurisdiction."" In addition, the
court cited an interpretation of another Indian statute which held that
6
a grant of jurisdiction to a state over Indian lands is non-exclusive."
2. The Requirement of Governmental Power
The court next found that the Tribe met the second prong of the
IGRA test in that the Tribe exercised governmental power over the
settlement lands. This requirement is derived from the IGRA's definition
of "Indian lands. ' " ' 7 It is, however, less controversial than the requirement
of jurisdiction."' There is neither a direct nor indirect reference to9 the
"governmental power" requirement in the act's legislative history.'' The
court noted that an exercise of governmental power does not depend on
"theoretical authority" but must be shown through "concrete manifesof examples
tations" of that power. 120 The court then listed a number
2 ' and concluded
power'
of how the Tribe had exercised "governmental
22
that this requirement of the IGRA had been met by the Tribe.
Therefore, in finding that the Tribe met the requirements of both the
"jurisdictional" and "governmental power" prongs of the enabling test,
the court held that the Tribe was entitled to the rights granted in the
23

IGRA.1

D. The IGRA's Effect on the Settlement Act
Once the Narragansett court determined that the IGRA applied to the
Tribe's settlement lands, it proceeded to resolve the conflicts between the
that the IGRA operated
IGRA and the Settlement Act. The court ruled
124
Act.
Settlement
the
of
repeal
as an implied
25
The court first discussed the doctrine of implied repeal.' The court
held that the lower court had incorrectly applied the doctrine of pre114. Id. § 1711 ("Exclusive jurisdiction over any such action . ..")(emphasis added).
115. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 702; see also Rodriquez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525 (1987)
(stating rule of statutory construction that if language is included in one part of statute and omitted
in another, omission was intentional and substantive).
116. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 702; see United States v. Cook, 922 F.2d 1026, 1032 (2d Cir. 1991)
("Significantly absent is any allusion to a complete surrender of jurisdiction.").
117. 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4) (1988) ("The term Indian lands means .. .any lands ... over which
an Indian tribe exercises governmental power."); see Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 701 (stating that "one
element of the definition of 'Indian lands' requires that an Indian tribe 'exercise[ I governmental
power' over them.").
118. See supra notes 104-16 and accompanying text.
119. See Senate Report, supra note 28.
120. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 703.
121. Id. at 703 (citing Tribe's housing authority, recognition by Environmental Protection Agency
as a "governing body," its participation in Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act, and various other programs as evidence of Tribe's "governmental power.").
122. Id. ("These activities adequately evince that the Tribe exercises more than enough governmental
power to satisfy the second prong of the statutory test.").
123. Id.
124. Id. at 705.
125. Id.
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emption, stating that the correct mode of analysis when two federal

statutes collide is that of implied repeal. 26 In order for one statute to
impliedly repeal another, one statute must be repugnant, at least in part,
to the other. In other words, the goal is to give both effect if at all

possible. 127
The state argued that the Settlement Act survived the enactment of

the IGRA. In doing so, the state relied heavily on the legislative history
of the IGRA. Specifically, the state pointed to a discussion of the IGRA
on the Senate floor in which the two senators from Rhode Island, Senator
Pell and Senator Chafee, were assured by the IGRA's sponsor, Senator
Inouye, that the Settlement Act and its protections would remain in
effect after the enactment of the IGRA. 21 The court characterized the
legislative history argument as a "flanking maneuver,"'' 29 stating that it
should look to the legislative history of the statute only when the language

of the statute is ambiguous.' 3 0

The state next argued that Rhode Island is exempted from the IGRA
based on the IGRA's "consensual transfer" provision.' This provision
mandates jurisdiction for criminal prosecutions of gambling violations
126. Id.; see also United States v. Tynen, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 88, 92 (1870) (applying doctrine
of implied repeal); United States v. Cook, 922 F.2d 1026, 1033 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The issue in the
case is not whether the [federal statutes] preempted [the federal statute], but whether the former
two implicitly repealed the latter.").
127. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 703; see also Tynen, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 92 ("When there are
two acts on the same subject the rule is to give effect to both if possible. But if the two are
repugnant ... the latteract ... operates to the extent of the repugnancy as a repeal of the first
..... "); Cook, 922 F.2d at 1034 ("For a repeal by implication, the provisions of one must be
repugnant to the other.").
128. That discussion between the senators went as follows:
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I would like to thank the managers of S. 555, the
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act . . .for their hard work and patience in achieving
a consensus on this important measure.
In the interests of clarity, I have asked that the language specifically citing the
protections of the Rhode Island Indian Claims Settlement Act (Public Law 95-395)
be stricken from S. 555. 1 understand that these protections clearly will remain in
effect.
Mr. INOUYE. I thank my colleague, the senior Senator from Rhode Island [Mr.
Pell], and assure him that the protections of the Rhode Island Indian Claims
Settlement Act (P.L. 95-395), will remain in effect and that the Narragansett Indian
Tribe will clearly remain subject to the civil, criminal, and regulatory laws of the
State of Rhode Island.
Mr. CHAFEE. Mr. President, I too would like to thank the chairman .... The
chairman's statement makes it clear that any high stakes gaming, including bingo,
in Rhode Island will remain subject to the civil, criminal, and regulatory laws of
our State.
134 CONG. REC. 24,023 (1988).
129. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 697.
130. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 697 ("[Clourts must look primarily to statutory language, not to
legislative history ....");see also Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 305 (1957) (finding that
judicial construction is unnecessary where there is no ambiguity in language of statute); Browder
v. United States, 312 U.S. 335, 338 (1941) (stating that plain language should be source of
interpretation); United States v. Meyer, 808 F.2d 912, 915 (1st Cir. 1987) ("Where .. .the language
of a statute seems clear and unambiguous, courts should be extremely hesitant to search for ways
to interpose their own notion's of Congress's intent.").
131. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 697 ("This [consensual transfer] proviso, Rhode Island asseverates,
presages an exemption applicable to the settlement lands.").
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on Indian land. 3 2 The state argued that the Settlement Act, as federal
law, invoked this provision, thus exempting Rhode Island3 4 from the
First, the
IGRA.' a3 The court rejected this argument on two grounds.
court emphasized that the consensual transfer provision deals only with
criminal prosecutions and has no effect on civil or regulatory jurisdicto "gamtion.' Second, the court stated that the provision applies only
the IGRA. 3 6
bling," which does not include gaming as defined in
IGRA, combined
The court's refusal to exempt Rhode Island from the
3 7 led the court to
with its rejection of the IGRA's legislative history,
hold that the IGRA applies "with full force" to the Narragansett's
settlement lands.

38

132. The consensual transfer provision reads:
The United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions of
violations of State gambling laws that are made applicable under this section to
Indian country, unless an Indian tribe pursuant to a Tribal-State compact approved
by the Secretary of the Interior under section -1l(d)(8) of the [IGRA], or under
any other provision of Federal law, has consented to the transfer to the State of
criminal jurisdiction with respect to gambling on the lands of the Indian tribe.
18 U.S.C. § 1166(d) (1988).
133. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 697.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 1166(d) (1988) (stating that § 1166 applies to "[s]tate gambling laws")
(emphasis added); § 1166(c) ("For purposes of this section, the term 'gambling' does not include(1) class I gaming or class II gaming regulated by the [IGRA], or class III gaming conducted under
a Tribal-State compact .... ").
137. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
138. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 705. Since Narragansett, Rhode Island has complied with the order
to enter into negotiations with the Tribe on class III gaming. On August 29, 1994, then Rhode
Island Governor Bruce Sundlun signed a compact with the Tribe allowing them to build a casino
in either West Greenwich, Rhode Island or on the Tribe's reservation in Charlestown, Rhode Island.
See Thomas Frank, Sundlun, TribeAgreeon Casino, PROVIDENCE J., Aug. 30, 1994, at AI ("Moments
after smoking a peace pipe in the governor's office, leaders of the Narragansett Indian tribe signed
a compact with Governor Sundlun yesterday allowing them to build a casino either in West Greenwich
or on their reservation in Charlestown."). Under the compact, the state is to receive 16.5 percent
of the casino's gross revenue, which is projected to be approximately $325 million a year. See id.
at Al, A6 ("The compact ... requires the tribe to pay the state 16.5 percent of the casino's gross
revenue . . . . With anticipated revenues of $325 million a year, the casino would funnel $53.6
million to the state."). In order to be built in West Greenwich, a site preferred over the settlement
lands due to its access to Interstate 95, the town must vote its approval in a town referendum.
See id. at Al ("But voters in West Greenwich ... must approve a referendum in November allowing
the tribe and Capital Gaming International Inc. of Atlantic City to build the 120,000-square-foot
casino with 3,000 slot machines. Capital Gaming would manage the casino.").
On October 3, 1994, the state's petition for a writ of certiorari was denied by the Court. 115
S. Ct. 298 (1994).
On January 19, 1995, newly-elected Rhode Island Governor Lincoln Almond filed suit in U.S.
District Court asking that gambling at the Tribe's future casino be limited to the forms of gambling
currently allowed in Rhode Island. This would bar table games and coin slot machines, severely
limiting the casino's drawing power. See Scott MacKay, Almond Seeks Lid on Gaming, PROVIDENCE
J., Jan. 20, 1995, at Al.
On January 20, 1995, a federal judge ruled that a suit brought by Rhode Island Attorney General
Jeffrey Pine, seeking a ruling that former Governor Bruce Sundlun violated the state Constitution
when he signed the tribal-state compact, should be decided by the Rhode Island Supreme Court.
See John Hill, Casino Ruling Goes to R.I. Justices, PROVIDENCE J., Jan. 21, 1995, at Al. Pine
is claiming that the compact amended or repealed state laws without the General Assembly's approval,
thus violating the state Constitution. Id. The federal judge, in his ruling, emphasized that while
the IGRA required the governor to negotiate, it did not specify who had to approve the agreement
for the state. Id. at A5.
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IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

A Critical Analysis of the Court's Major Holdings in
Narragansett

I. The Narragansett Tribe Met the Two-Pronged Test of the IGRA
The court's choice of a concurrent jurisdiction requirement is a clear
application of the special rules of statutory interpretation favoring Indian
tribes. 3 9 This application, however, questionably ignores the IGRA's
legislative history. There is no direct reference to the jurisdictional requirement of the IGRA in the legislative history' 4° and the First Circuit,
in discussing the requirement, did not attempt to ascertain any legislative
intent. One could, however, draw inferences from the legislative history.
First, the legislative history says that it is the "responsibility of the
Congress ... to adjust, where appropriate, the jurisdictional framework"
of Indian lands.' 4' This statement would seem to discount some, if not
all, of the weight given to the historical background of Indian sovereignty
upon which the court so heavily relied. 42 Second, review of 25 U.S.C.
§ 2170(d)(3)(A) reveals that the legislative history does not contain the
phrase "having jurisdiction over the Indian lands.' ' 43 This could be
interpreted in two different ways. The state would argue that the inclusion
of the phrase in the final draft indicates that the phrase (and thus the
jurisdictional requirement) is substantively significant. The Tribe would
argue that the absence of the phrase in the legislative history would
indicate a lack of Congress' intent to impose any jurisdictional requirement
at all. The court, in holding that the IGRA required only concurrent
jurisdiction, could have alternatively ruled that the requirement of jurisdiction under the IGRA was one of exclusive jurisdiction, thereby
disqualifying the Tribe of rights under the IGRA.
2. The IGRA Impliedly Repealed the Settlement Act
The First Circuit's analysis of the interface between the IGRA and the
Settlement Act is flawed because it improperly applied the doctrine of
implied repeal, questionably ignored strong legislative history, and misinterpreted the "consensual transfer" provision of the IGRA. The court
did not discuss the rule of statutory construction that, for one statute
to be considered a substitute for another, and not merely a continuation,
the latter statute must clearly be intended as a substitute.' 44 Moreover,
in examining the implied repeal of the Settlement Act, the court disre-

139. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
140. See Senate Report, supra note 28, at 3071-106.
141. Id. at 3073.
142. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
143. Senate Report, supra note 28, at 3088.
144. See Posadas v. Nat'l City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936) ("[A]s a general thing ... the
latter act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act ...").
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garded specific precedent which instructs a court to look at whether
the court
Congress intended an implied repeal. 45 As previously discussed,
46 In the context
IGRA.
the
of
history
generally disregarded the legislative
of the implied repeal issue, this decision led the court to rule that the
IGRA acts as an implied repeal of the Settlement Act, whereas an
history would likely have led the court to
examination of the legislative
47
the opposite conclusion.'

In ruling that it should not look at the IGRA's legislative history, the
court ignored precedent instructing a court to look beyond the statutory
intent that
language, especially in cases where there is clear congressional
48
the court
Curiously,
statute.
the
of
language
express
the
contradicts
and
"clear
as
floor
Senate
the
on
conversation
the
consider
not
did
enthe
survive
would
Settlement
the
that
intent
legislative
convincing"
actment of the IGRA.' 49 The court held that the remarks of legislators
50
should not be given controlling effect. However, there is precedent to
the contrary, especially when the statements are precisely directed to a
specific issue and are unambiguous,"' as was the case with the Rhode
5 2 The court further stated that the remarks
Island senators' statements.
of the IGRA's sponsor (Senator Inouye) are not determinative of conwhere other courts have held that the sponsor's
gressional intent,'
145. See Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981) ("[Wle decline to read the statutes as being
in irreconcilable conflict without seeking to ascertain the actual intent of Congress."); United States
v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939) ("The intention of the legislature to repeal 'must be clear
and manifest."'); Posadas, 296 U.S. at 503 ("[T]he intention of the legislature to repeal must be
); Palmore v. Superior Court of District of Columbia, 515 F.2d 1294,
clear and manifest ....
1307-08 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (noting importance of Congressional intent on issue of implied repeal);
see also IA Norman J. Singer, Sutherland on Stat. Const. § 23.09 (5th ed. 1993) (noting significance
of Congressional intent to impliedly repeal).
146. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
147. See id.
148. See I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987) ("[W]e look to the legislative
history to determine only whether there is 'clearly expressed legislative intention' contrary to that
language .... "); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981) ("[Alscertainment of the meaning
[Tihe plain-meaning rule
apparent on the face of a single statute need not end the inquiry ....
is 'rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of
persuasive evidence if it exists."'); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981) ("[lun the
absence of a 'clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be
regarded as conclusive."') (emphasis added).
149. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 697.
150. Id. at 699 ("Although we give full faith and credit to the earnestness senators involved in
this exchange, we are unable to accept the colloquy at face value."); see also Brock v. Pierce
County, 476 U.S. 253, 263 (1986) ("Such statements by individual legislators should not be given
controlling effect .... ").
151. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 237 (1984) ("Oral testimony of ... individual Congressmen,
unless very precisely directed to the intended meaning of particular words in a statute, can seldom
be expected to be as precise as the enacted language itself.") (emphasis added); Weinberger v. Rossi,
456 U.S. 25, 35 (1982) ("[Olne isolated remark by a single Senator, ambiguous in meaning when
) (emphasis
examined in context, is insufficient to establish ... congressional expression .
added).
152. See supra note 128.
153. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 699; see also Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 n.15 (1982)
("The contemporaneous remarks of a sponsor . . . are certainly not controlling .... "); Consumer
Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 118 (1980) (discounting sponsors'
statements).
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statements are to be considered.' 5 4 Ultimately, the court refused to give
any controlling weight to the direct statements of the senators, evidencing
once again its deference to the interests of the Tribe.' 55
The court held that the "consensual transfer" provision of the IGRA
was only applicable to criminal, and not regulatory, prosecutions. Gambling, however, while being an entity that the state wants to regulate,
is also a crime in Rhode Island.' 5 6 The court did not consider this fact.
The court also held that this provision did not apply to gaming as defined
in the IGRA. But it seems contradictory that the consensual transfer
provision itself explicitly mentions the compacting process of the IGRA.IS7
Indeed, a federal district court had previously interpreted this provision
as being specifically intended to exempt Rhode Island from the IGRA. 58
B.

Can an Indian Tribe Sue a State Under the IGRA?: Tenth and
Eleventh Amendment Issues Not Addressed in Narragansett
One way states have tried to avoid forced negotiations on a tribalstate compact is to refuse to negotiate and then assert a Tenth' 9 or
Eleventh '6° Amendment defense in an action by the Indian tribes to force
the states to negotiate. Courts have been split on both arguments. Interestingly, the court in Narragansett did not address this issue, most
likely because the court action was brought by the State (seeking an
injunction) and not by the Tribe.' 6' But a complete treatment of the
IGRA would be lacking without a discussion of these constitutional issues.
The argument for upholding a Tenth Amendment defense is that
Congress cannot compel a state to "regulate. ' '

62

Thus, it has been held

154. See North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982) ("[The remarks] of
the sponsor ... are an authoritative guide to the statute's construction."); Federal Energy Admin.
v. Algonquin SNG, 426 U.S. 548, 564 (1976) (stating that sponsor's remarks should be given
substantial weight); United States v. Massachusetts Maritime Academy, 762 F.2d 142, 149 (1st Cir.
1985) (noting that Court has treated bill's sponsors' views as authoritative on congressional intent
behind legislation).
155. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
156. See R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-19-1 to 11-19-31 (1994).
157. 18 U.S.C. § 1166(d) (1988 & Supp. 1994) (stating significance of whether Indian tribe has
transferred jurisdiction "pursuant to a Tribal-State compact ....").
158. See Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 743 F. Supp.
645, 653-54 (W.D. Wis. 1990) ("The legislative history leaves no doubt that the consensual transfer
provisions in § 1166(d) did not refer to Pub.L. 280 transfer of jurisdiction by fiat, but to a recent
Indian land claims settlement in Rhode Island ....").The court in Narragansett ruled that the
Lac Du Flambeau court erred in its interpretation of the consensual transfer provision due to its
erroneous reliance on the Senate report of the IGRA. Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 697 n.12; see Senate
Report, supra note 28, at 3090 ("Sect. 23. - Makes clear that gaming on Indian lands in the
State of Rhode Island must be conducted in accordance with State law.").
159. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
160. The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit ... commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CoNsT. amend.
XI.
161. See Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 690.
162. See Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, 834 F. Supp. 1341, 1346 (W.D. OkI. 1992) ("Although
Congress can urge a State ... to adopt a legislative program ... it cannot compel the state to
regulate.").
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that the IGRA exceeded the power of Congress by requiring states to
negotiate tribal-state gaming compacts.' 6 3 At the same time, it has been
1
held that the IGRA does not violate the Tenth AmendmentM because
the state is not "forced" to negotiate and is only being given an op165
One
portunity to provide input on regulation of class III gaming.
find Tenth
not
would
Court
commentator has stated that the Supreme
1
Amendment difficulties with the IGRA. 6
The Eleventh Amendment issue has been dealt with more frequently.
Some courts have held that the Eleventh Amendment bars an action by
67 The rationale behind
an Indian tribe against a state under the IGRA.
this position is that in regulating the states, Congress is acting beyond
its Indian Commerce Clause 68 power. 169 Other courts, holding that the
Eleventh Amendment does not bar an action under the IGRA, argue
that it was the intent of Congress in enacting the IGRA to abrogate
state immunity,1 76 and that the IGRA does in fact abrogate such immunity.' 7' The argument behind this position is the intent of the statute
and the fact that states are not penalized for not negotiating but72 may
The
only lose their right to have input on class III gaming regulation.
Court recently invited the Solicitor General to file briefs on an appeal
by the Seminole Tribe of Florida of an Eleventh Circuit decision upholding
a state's irmunity under the Eleventh Amendment in the context of the
IGRA.

173

163. See id. at 1347 ("[T]he [IGRA] exceeds the powers of Congress .....
164. See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 830 F. Supp. 523, 527 (D. S.D. 1993)
(holding that IGRA does not violate Tenth Amendment).
165. See id. at 526 ("The IGRA does not 'force' states to compact with Indian Tribes .....
166. See Bisset, supra note 40, at 90 ("It seems likely that the Supreme Court would hold that
IGRA does not run afoul of the Tenth Amendment, either because it requires no action by states
at all or because it does not impermissibly 'coerce' state regulation .... ).
167. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, !1 F.3d 1016, 1019 (lth Cir. 1994) (holding that action
under IGRA violates Eleventh Amendment); Ponca Tribe v. Oklahoma, 834 F. Supp. 1341, 1345
(W.D. Okl. 1992) ("[Tjhe court concludes the plaintiff's action against the State ... is barred by
the Eleventh Amendment."); Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians v. Michigan, 800 F. Supp.
1484, 1490 (W.D. Mich. 1992) (holding that suits under IGRA are barred by Eleventh Amendment).
168. The Indian Commerce Clause provides: "[The Congress shall have power] . . .[tJo regulate
Commerce . . .with the Indian Tribes .... " U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl.3.
169. See Ponca, 834 F. Supp. at 1345-46 (holding that Indian Commerce Clause did not authorize
Congress to abrogate state immunity via the IGRA).
170. See Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v. Kansas, 818 F. Supp. 1423, 1427 (D. Kan. 1993) ("Congress
fully contemplated and expressed its desire to give the tribes a federal forum by which they could
compel the states to negotiate fairly with them .... [A] clearer statement of the intent to abrogate
is difficult to envision."); see also French, supra note 54, at 737 ("[Sltates should not be able to
contravene IGRA's goals by asserting an Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity defense.").
171. See Kickapoo, 818 F. Supp. at 1427 (holding that IGRA abrogates state's immunity); see
also Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 830 F. Supp. 523, 526 (D. S.D. 1993) (stating
that IGRA abrogates state immunity); Joseph J.Weissman, Note, Upping the Ante: Allowing Indian
Tribes to Sue States in Federal Court under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 62 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 123 (1993) (arguing that Congress abrogated Eleventh Amendment bar in enacting IGRA).
172. See Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 830 F. Supp. at 526 ("Under the IGRA,
no penalties can be assessed against a state for failing to negotiate. What the state would lose by
such a stance would be possible input into a Tribal-State gaming compact.").
173. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 63 U.S.L.W. 3064 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1994).
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Thus, in examining Narragansett, one must not disregard these constitutional issues as they might govern future IGRA cases. The
inconsistency'7 4 in the judicial decisions to date makes it difficult to
predict how the next court might rule. 175 It does seem likely, however,
that the constitutional questions pertaining
to the IGRA will eventually
76
be answered by the Supreme Court.
V.

IMPACT

The First Circuit's decision in Narragansett provides insight into how
federal courts might interpret Indian legislation in general and the IGRA
specifically. As a starting point, it is clear that courts will construe
legislation that affects Indians in favor of the Indians. The first prong
of the IGRA enabling test, jurisdiction, will be met in most cases if the
court examining the requirement uses the concepts of Indian sovereignty
and self-government as a backdrop. Beyond that, the court in Narragansett
went so far as to rule that concurrent jurisdiction was enough to meet
the requirement and that the Settlement Act did not give the state exclusive
jurisdiction. It seems that this methodology could be applied to any
state's pre-IGRA settlement agreement.
The court in Narragansett did look for concrete examples of governmental power in examining the second prong requirement. One must
wonder, however, if this thorough examination was a result of the court's
a priori knowledge that the Tribe would fulfill the requirement and
whether a tribe with less concrete examples of governmental power would
be held to a less rigorous test in order to come to the same result.
The court's treatment of the IGRA's legislative history has the most
disturbing effect. It is clear from the legislative history, especially the
conversations between Senators Inouye, Pell, and Chafee, that the Senate
intended that the Settlement Act remain in full force after the enactment
of the IGRA. But the court, through citations to rebuttable rules of
interpretation, discounted this compelling legislative history.
Narragansettshould be taken as a warning to states that wish to prevent
class III gaming on Indian settlement land within their borders. Future
courts now have Narragansett as precedent, making decisions in favor
of Indian tribes even easier to accomplish in future IGRA cases. A state
should not take comfort in the IGRA's two-pronged test, as a court can
easily find both prongs satisfied. In addition, a state should not rely on

174. See Eric D. Jones, Note, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: A Forum for Conflict Among
the Plenary Power of Congress, Tribal Sovereignty, and the Eleventh Amendment, 18 VT. L. REv.
127, 161 (1993) (noting the difficulties these inconsistencies on IGRA's Eleventh Amendment issues
pose to future rulings).
175. See Santoni, supra note 28, at 425 ("The complexity of the existing Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence makes it difficult to predict . . . the last word on the Eleventh Amendment issue.").
176. See Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: The Overview; U.S. Justices Open Their New
Session By Refusing Cases, N.Y. TtmEs, Oct. 4, 1994 ("[D]isagreement [on the Eleventh Amendment
issue], as well as the growing importance of the multibillion-dollar tribal casino business, makes
eventual Supreme Court review highly likely.").
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the use of the IGRA's legislative history, unless expressly supported in
the IGRA's final language. Thus, a state's best "defense" is a constitutional Tenth or Eleventh Amendment argument, which has had some
success in previous cases. 177
The court in Narragansettcompletely discounted the pre-IGRA Settle78
ment Act. Several other states have similar Indian claims settlement acts.
Of these states, only Maine and Massachusetts could possibly use their
referring
pre-IGRA acts to attack a tribe's jurisdiction under the IGRA by
1 79
to exclusive jurisdiction language within their settlement acts.
It is apparent that future courts, employing similar reasoning to that
of the First Circuit in Narragansett, will find in favor of Indian tribes.
To have any chance of success, any attack by states to prevent Indian
gaming should be launched from their Tenth and Eleventh Amendment
constitutional arsenal.
JOHN J. BOLTON

177. See supra notes 159-76 and accompanying text.
178. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1735 (1988) (Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act); id. §§ 1741-1749
(Florida Indian (Miccosukee) Land Claims Settlement Act); id. §§ 1751-1760 (Connecticut Indian
Land Claims Settlement Act); id. § 1771 (Massachusetts Indian Land Claims Settlement Act); id.
§ 1772 (Florida Indian (Seminole) Land Claims Settlement Act); id. § 1773 (Washington Indian
(Puyallup) Land Claims Settlement Act); id. § 1774 (Seneca Nation (New York) Land Ciaims
Settlement Act).
179. See Narragansett, 19 F.3d at 702 ("[B]oth [the Maine and Massachusetts] acts ... contain
corresponding limits on Indian jurisdiction, conspicuously absent from the Settlement Act."); 25
U.S.C. § 1725(f) (1988) (Maine Act states that tribes may only exercise jurisdiction to extent granted
in Act and any subsequent amendments thereto); 25 U.S.C. § 1771e(a) (Massachusetts Act setting
forth specific limits on Indian jurisdiction). Interestingly, Governor Weld of Massachusetts has
already signed an agreement with the Wampanoag Indian Tribe to build a casino in New Bedford,
Massachusetts. Meg Vaillancourt & Mitchell Zuckoff, Ante Upped on Casino Deal, BOSTON GLOBE,
Aug. 24, 1994, at I ("Gov. Weld yesterday hailed a proposed $175 million casino and theme park
for [the] struggling city [of New Bedford, Massachusetts] .... ").

